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This piece is about how two economically and socially different 
countries interpret and deal with the International Labour Organization’s 
(ILO) conventions in their respective legal systems.  Convention No. 87, 
regarding the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise, will serve as the basis for the discussion and comparison.  The 
article’s objective is to show that both Brazil and the United States restrict 
the right of labor organizing in different ways, but that both ways go against 
the recommendation of the ILO to allow workers to join the union of their 
choice.  The article does not intend to discuss sovereignty issues and points 
of view on that regard.  Each country’s view on sovereignty is definitely 
taken into consideration by governments when deciding on international 
instruments, such as the conventions of the ILO.  However, this article aims 
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to focus on the legal rationale used by the United States and Brazil when 
faced with Convention No. 87 of the ILO.  
The analysis will go into the reasons why neither Brazil nor the United 
States have ratified Convention No. 87.  It will take a closer look at these 
countries’ different approaches towards labor and employment rights, and 
the relationship between international law and their domestic laws.  This 
piece does not try to go over all the existing literature on the topic, but 
rather it brings out the opinion of recent writers and judicial decisions of 
both countries.  Throughout the comparison of both legal systems, it will be 
possible to see how developed and developing countries react to the 
attempts of international organizations to reach a global standard for the 
protection of workers’ rights and the weight needed for economic growth 
and market competition. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Introduction includes Part I of this article, which discusses the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the 
United Nations (U.N.), promoting labor and employment rights among its 
members.  One way it seeks to fulfill this mission is by obligating members 
to follow the regulations (i.e. covenants) they create by signing and 
ratifying.  Part II of this article sets out an overview of the eight covenants 
that the ILO considers to be fundamental on the basis of their delineation of 
the most basic labor and employment rights that aim at promoting fair 
working standards, social justice, and economic prosperity.  Part III takes a 
closer look at the Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise (Convention No. 87).  This is one of the 
aforementioned fundamental conventions, which deals with the right of 
workers to organize themselves, and have an active role in the formulation, 
and defend their interests.   
Parts IV and V of this article go into the Brazilian and the American 
domestic legal systems regarding international and labor law and their 
views of the ILO and Convention No. 87.  Neither Brazil nor the United 
States has ratified Convention No. 87.  Although these countries have 
different approaches towards labor rights, employment rights, and even 
towards the way international documents are ratified and then incorporated 
into their domestic legal systems, both have decided that the standards 
brought by Convention No. 87 conflict with their domestic standards.  
Thus, the conclusion of this article states that analyzing and comparing the 
manner in which countries, from different economic and industrial stages, 
recognize ILO’s international documents should be paramount when 
discussing international labor rights and building necessary and binding 
global standards for ILO members to follow.   
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II. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND 
ITS FUNDAMENTAL CONVENTIONS 
ILO was founded in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles that ended 
World War I, and aims to end “injustice, hardship and privation” by 
improving working conditions.1  ILO is a special agency within the U.N., 
containing 185 Member States, and has tripartite representation by 
governments, workers, and employers.2  For the purpose of achieving its 
goals, ILO regulates issues pertaining to labor and employment rights.3  
There are three instruments that ILO can use in pursuit of reaching its 
goals:  conventions, recommendations, and resolutions.4  Conventions and 
recommendations form the “International Labour Code,” and the 
resolutions are considered annexes.5  Only conventions can be ratified by 
Member States and become binding.6  Despite this power to make binding 
documents, “[t]he ILO is not an international parliament or a supranational 
organization it is more like a diplomatic conference in labor law and, in this 
condition, its strength depends on the consent of its participants.”7  
After a convention is adopted, its text is transmitted to Member States 
to be examined during a period of twelve or eighteen months.8  If a Member 
State approves the convention, it will contact and submit a report to the 
International Labour Office detailing if there is any difficulty that might 
impede or delay the ratification.9  A Member State may also agree to only 
part of the convention.10  In that case, the State can partially ratify the 
convention if the text of the document so allows.11 
                                                
1. ILO CONST. pmbl.; Origins and History – Int’l Labour Org., ILO.ORG, 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2016). 
2. About the ILO – Int’l Labour Org., ILO.ORG, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang-
-en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
3. Id. 
4. ILO Legal Instruments – Int’l Labour Org., ILO.ORG, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/how-the-ilo-works/departments-and-offices/jur/legal-instruments/lang--en/index.htm (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2016). 
5.  ILO Bureau of Public Information, The International Labour Organization ¶¶ 3, 24 (Sept. 
12, 2016), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/icic/orgs/copac/member/ilo/ilo-text.html. 
6. ILO CONST. art. 20. 
7. AMAURI MASCARO NASCIMENTO, CURSO DE DIREITO DO TRABALHO, 136–37 (26th ed. 
2011). 
8. Id. at 137. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 138.  
11. Id. at 137.  
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In 1998, ILO recognized some of its conventions as fundamental 
because they represent “core labor standards,” defined as the most 
important labor principles pertaining to workers’ human rights.12  Brazilian 
Professor Rúbia Zanotelli explains that the eight fundamental conventions 
“cover four essential areas:  freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargain; eradication of child labor; eradication of forced labor 
and non-discrimination in employment or occupation.”13  Below is a chart 
illustrating the fundamental conventions and their ratification dates both by 
Brazil and by the United States, the countries discussed in this article.14 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12. INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION'S FUNDAMENTAL 
CONVENTIONS, 7 (2002). 
13. Juliana Maria Ferraz Fernandes, A Convenção No. 151 da oit e os Impactos Imediatos de 
sua Promulgação para o Ordenamento Jurídico Brasileiro.  Uma Análise da Adaptações legais 
necessárias à Aplicação do direito de Negociação Coletiva no setor Público § 2.5 (2013), 
http://dspace.idp.edu.br:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/1247/Monografia_%20Juliana%20Ma
ria%20Ferrz%20Fernandes.pdf?sequence=1. 
14. See generally INT'L LABOUR ORG., Ratifications of fundamental Conventions by country, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:10011:0::NO::P10011_DISPLAY_BY,P1001
1_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:1,F [hereinafter Ratifications];  See generally INT'L LABOUR ORG., 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312232 
[hereinafter Freedom of Association]; See generally INT'L LABOUR ORG., Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Conventions, 1949 (No.98), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000: 
12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312243 [hereinafter Right to Organise]; See generally 
INT'L LABOUR ORG., Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en 
/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312174 [hereinafter Forced Labour 
Convention]; See generally INT'L LABOUR ORG., Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 
105), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID: 
312250 [hereinafter Abolition of Forced Labour Convention];  See generally INT'L LABOUR ORG., 
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138),http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0:: 
NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312283 [hereinafter Minimum Age Convention]; See generally 
INT'L LABOUR ORG., Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327 
[hereinafter Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention];  See generally INT'L LABOUR ORG., Equal 
Remuneration Convention, 191 (No. 100), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO:1 
2100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312245 [hereinafter Equal Remuneration Convention]; See generally 
INT'L LABOUR ORG., Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312256 
[hereinafter Discrimination Convention)]. 
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FUNDAMENTAL 
CONVENTIONS SUBJECT 
DATE  
OF 
APPROVAL 
RATIFICATI
ON  
BY BRAZIL 
RATIFICATION 
BY THE 
UNITED 
STATES 
87 
Freedom of 
Association 
and Protection 
of the Right to 
Organise 
Convention 
 
07/09/1948 - - 
98 
Right to 
Organise and 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Convention 
 
07/01/1949 11/18/1952 - 
29 
Forced Labour 
Convention 
 
06/28/1930 04/25/1957 - 
105 
Abolition of 
Forced Labour 
Convention 
 
06/25/1957 06/18/1965 25/09/1991 
138 
Minimum Age 
Convention 
 
06/26/1973 06/28/2001 - 
182 
Worst Forms of 
Child Labour 
Convention 
 
06/17/1999 02/02/2000 02/12/1999 
100 
Equal 
Remuneration 
Convention 
 
06/29/1951 04/25/1957 - 
111 
Discrimination 
(Employment 
and 
Occupation) 
Convention 
 
06/25/1958 11/26/1965 - 
 
Brazil has signed most of the fundamental conventions, whereas the 
United States has signed only two of them.  Neither Brazil nor the United 
States has signed Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and the 
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Protection of the Right to Organise, although both countries are free 
democracies that protect the freedom of association in their constitutions.15 
One of the problems ILO faces is “[t]he idea that workers’ rights and 
labour standards impair employment and slow down economic growth.”16  
Moreover,  
As long as this narrative remains entrenched, national labour 
standards, rules to strengthen collective voice and enhance 
bargaining, and other institutions designed to address either the 
general or particular predicaments of workers will manifest as 
second-best solutions which States may be able to afford when 
times are good but which are at perennial risk . . . as soon as 
things get bad.17  
It is very likely that this thought is what led Brazil and the United 
States to avoid ratifying some of the ILO conventions, the former because it 
aims at increasing its development and the latter to keep its development 
rates.  
III. CONVENTION NO. 87 ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE 
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE 
Convention No. 87 of the International Labour Organization was 
adopted in 1948 and has been signed by 153 countries.18  Of all the 
fundamental conventions, No. 87 is the least ratified, as can be seen from 
the graph below:19 
                                                
15. Ratifications, supra note 14; Freedom of Associations, supra note 14; Right to Organise, 
supra note 14; Forced Labour Convention, supra note 14; Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 
supra note 14; Minimum Age Convention, supra note 14. See What Countries have Democratic 
Governments?, https://www.reference.com/government-politics/countries-democratic-governmentsfa11 
94558dfc69a8 (last visited Sept. 15, 2016). 
16. Kerry Rittich, The ILO:  Challenges in times of crisis, 154 INT’L LABOUR REV. 85, 86 
(2015). 
17. Id. at 86–87.  
18. INT'L LABOUR ORG., Ratification Comparative Data, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/norm 
lex/en/f?p=1000:10001:0::NO::: (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Ratification Comparative Data]. 
19. Id.  
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Convention No. 87 is about the right that all workers and employers, 
without distinction, shall have to establish and to join organizations of their 
own choosing without previous authorization.20  The objective is “to protect 
the autonomy and independence of workers’ and employers’ organizations 
in relation to the public authorities, in their establishment and in their 
functioning and dissolution.”21   
In 2008, ILO launched a report on global freedom of association, this 
document is part of a major global report following the ILO’s declaration 
regarding the fundamental labor principles and rights at the ninety-seventh 
session of the International Labor Conference in 2008.22  The report 
revealed that many States are interested in Convention No. 87 and in the 
pursuit of a higher number of ratifications.23   
The specific report on freedom of association further demonstrated 
that some of the countries that are among the most densely populated or 
have the greatest industrial importance, are among the ones that have not 
ratified Convention No. 87.24  This fact caught the ILO policy-makers’ 
attention because a great number of workers and employers were not 
beneficiaries of the protection established by the convention.25  The report 
states that:  
                                                
20. Freedom of Association, supra note 14, at art. 2. 
21.  Int'l Labour Office Geneva, General Survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning 
rights at work in light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, International 
Labour Conference, 19 (2012), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/ 
documents/meetingdocument/wcms_174846.pdf. 
22. See International Labour Office Geneva, Freedom of Association in practice:  Lessons 
learned, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE (2008), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_096122.pdf [hereinafter Freedom of Association in 
practice]. 
23. Id. at 85–87. 
24. Id. at 6. 
25. Id.  
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[a]bout half of the total active population of the member States of 
the ILO live in five of the countries that have not yet ratified the 
Convention 87 (Brazil, China, India, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, and the United States).  In the last four years these countries 
have not taken any significant measures towards ratification.26 
 
The report also states that Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
assumed a series of commitments by signing the Labor-Social Declaration 
of Mercosur in 1998.27  This is because the Declaration of Mercosur makes 
reference to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
from the ILO.28  As such, it reaffirms these countries’ commitments to 
respecting, promoting, and implementing the rights and obligations 
contained in the core conventions of the ILO.29  However, these countries 
do not seem to have fulfilled the cited commitment.  As the graph below 
shows, most of the complaints about violations of the freedom of 
association come from the Americas:30 
 
The Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) is a complaint 
mechanism utilized by ILO; the Committee may hear complaints against 
governments even if the country is not a party to Convention No. 87.31  
“The CFA has long been lauded for its contribution to human and labor 
union rights.”32  However, its review is not a binding obligation.  ILO 
especially encourages the ratification of the fundamental conventions and 
                                                
26. Id.  
27. Freedom of Association in practice, supra note 22, at 39. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 9. 
31. Id. at xii.  
32. Steve Charnovitz, The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and its Future in the 
United States, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (2008).  
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the Member State actions that aim at effectively fulfilling those rights, such 
as implementation and harmonization with domestic laws.33  
Professor Mariângela Ariosi understands that international treaties 
with labor nature should be analyzed as human rights matters, especially 
concerning their hierarchy in the domestic legal system.34  Indeed, countries 
like Brazil provide special treatment when international documents involve 
human rights, but that does not make it any easier to solve harmonization 
difficulties. 
When it comes to the harmonization between ILO conventions and 
States’ domestic legislation, ILO has specific procedures to give Member 
States some guidance:  
The ILO works with [M]ember States that want to bring their 
national laws into line with international labour standards.  The 
development of appropriate legal frameworks to govern relations 
between employers, workers and governments and sound 
functioning of industrial relations, help to ensure the rule of law 
in the labour market.35 
In this regard, harmonization with the domestic legal system was the 
reason raised by both Brazil and by the United States for not ratifying 
Convention No. 87. 
IV. BRAZIL’S DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM 
A. International Conventions in Brazil’s Legal System 
Since the promulgation of its democratic constitution in 1988, Brazil 
began an opening period to international norms and expanded its 
constitutional protection of human rights.36  Therefore, Brazil was engaged 
in the international movement towards the protection of human rights by 
signing and ratifying international treaties on this regard as part of its 
                                                
33. Conventions and Recommendations – Int’l Labour Org., ILO.ORG, http://www.ilo.org/ 
global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang-
-en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
34. Mariângela F. Ariosi, Principais discussões na doutrina e na jurisprudência sobre os 
tratados de direitos humanos de conteúdo trabalhista, JUS NAVIGANDI (Nov. 2004), https://jus.com. 
br/artigos/5947/principais-discussoes-na-doutrina-e-na-jurisprudencia-sobre-os-tratados-dedireitoshuma 
nos-de-conteudo-trabalhista. 
35. Freedom of Association in practice, supra note 22, at 63. 
36. Paulo S. Pinheiro, Democratic Consolidation and Human Rights in Brazil, KELLOGG 
INST., § 2 (1998), https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers.pdf. 
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international agenda.37  The Constitution of 1988 prescribes the integration 
of these international documents into Brazil’s domestic legal system, giving 
them constitutional status to increase their protection.38 
As can be seen in Title II of the Brazilian Constitution, which 
discusses the Fundamental Rights and Guarantees, Article Five is the first 
article in this title to address the important considerations regarding these 
rights.39  In Paragraph One, it explains that fundamental rights are 
immediately applicable, that is, there is no need for further regulations in 
order for the right to be considered.40  In Paragraph Two, which is of great 
importance in this discussion, it specifies that the fundamental rights 
expressed in the Constitution are not exclusive and rights coming from 
international treaties, of which Brazil is part of, are also constitutionally 
protected.41 
In the Brazilian legal treatises, Paragraph Three is the most discussed, 
and it is also the most recent since it was added to the Brazilian 
Constitution in 2004.42  It dictates that only international human rights 
treaties that undergo the same approval procedure of constitutional 
amendments, a longer and more difficult approval process, will be 
considered as constitutional amendments, thus, having the highest hierarchy 
in the constitution.43  As the constitution states, “International human rights 
treaties and conventions which are approved in each House of the National 
Congress, in two rounds of voting, by three fifths of the votes of the 
respective members shall be equivalent to constitutional amendments.”44 
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 was developed from the break of 
the authoritarian regime that started in 1964.  The political background for 
this decision can be noticed in the importance the Constitution framers gave 
to fundamental human rights, and by the preoccupation with the country’s 
image in the international scenario. 
                                                
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. CONST. OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 2010, art. 5.  
40. CONST. OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 2010, art. 5, para. 1. 
41. CONST. OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 2010, art. 5, para. 2. 
42. CONST. OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 2010, art. 1 (amended 2004); CONST. 
OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 2010, art. 5, para. 3.  
43.  CONST. OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 2010, art. 5, para. 3. 
44. CONST. OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 2010, art. 5, para. 3. 
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B. The International Labour Organization and Convention No. 87—
Brazil’s View 
Brazil is one of the original members of the International Labour 
Organization.  It was already a member in November 1, 1945 when ILO 
was incorporated to the U.N. as one of its specialized agencies.45  Brazil 
was also one of ILO’s members when the Organization was founded in 
1919.46 
Convention No. 87 is about full freedom of association and protection 
of the right to organize as well as the plurality of organization, defined as 
the existence of many union units concerning the same issue or in the same 
territorial base. 
In this convention, workers and employers, without distinction, 
have the right to organize or be part of an organization of their 
choosing, to promote and defend their interests.  Therefore, these 
organizations have the right to elaborate their statutes and 
regulations, freely elect their representatives and organize their 
administration, according to art.  three of the convention.47 
Brazil did not ratify Convention No. 87 because the Convention allows 
for the plurality of organizations, whereas the Brazilian Constitution does 
not.  Article Eight of Brazil’s Constitution determines the singleness of 
labor organizations per territory.48  Singleness is defined as a limitation 
imposed by the government against the freedom of workers to join the 
organization of their choice.49  This is because the government only allows 
one organization for a specific profession or category, and in a specific 
region.  For example, in an entire city all the metalworkers of all industries 
can only be organized under the same workers’ organization, the only one 
permitted to act in that city.  Therefore, if Brazil ratified Convention No. 
87, there would be a conflict between the international norm and the 
domestic norm. 
                                                
45. ILO CONST. art. 1. 
46. INT’L LABOUR ORG., Brazil, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/F?P=1000:11110:0:: 
no:11110:P11110_country_id:102571.  
47. Freedom of Association, supra note 14, at art. 3. 
48. CONST. OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 2010, art. 8. 
49. FLÁVIA PIOVESAN, DIREITOS HUMANOS E O DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL INTERNACIONAL 
159 (Jônatas Junqueira de Mello ed., 14th ed. 2013).  
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C. Workers’ Freedom of Association in the Brazilian Legal System 
Labor law experts in Brazil criticize the Brazilian union model to a 
great degree.  Jose Carlos Arouca, a Brazilian federal judge in labor and 
employment courts, argues that the model is archaic.50  Norms that come 
from collective bargains may be even more important than conditions 
stipulated in an individual employment contract, because the hypo-
sufficiency of an individual worker is superseded by workers discussing 
employment terms on an equal footing with the owner of the employment 
positions, the employers. 
In Brazil, the first unions were called “workers’ leagues” and started 
between 1800 and 1900, as a result of the influence brought by European 
immigrants who arrived in Brazil.51  Rural unions were first officially 
recognized in 1903, and urban ones in 1907.52  In 1930, however, 
unionization suffered with the State’s intervention during a period known as 
the “Vargas Era” when President Getulio Vargas created the Ministry of 
Labor, Industry and Commerce.53 
Governmental interference ultimately harmed the freedom of 
association.  In 1943, the Consolidation of Labor Legislation (CLT in 
Portuguese), a Brazilian labor legislation, was promulgated.54  In 1964, with 
the beginning of the military dictatorship in Brazil, intervention upon 
unions increased and a new kind of union emerged:  assisted unions, which 
received its assistance from government resources and as such were limited 
by what the government considered proper. 
With the enactment of the democratic Constitution of 1988, unions 
regained some of their freedom by eliminating governmental intervention.55  
However, some characteristics were kept, such as the union singleness 
discussed here.  According to Arouca, what happens in Brazil is something 
labor writers coined “inverted pluralism”: 
                                                
50. See generally JOSE CARLOS AROUCA, O FUTURO DO DIREITO SINDICAL 654 (2007).  
51. Colin Everett, Organized labor in Brazil 1900–1937:  from anarchist origins to 
government control, LIBCOM.ORG (Jan. 12, 2011), https://libcom.org/history/organized-labor-brazil-
1900-1937-anarchist-origins-government-control-colin-everett.  
52. Id. at 5–6.  
53. Id. at 11.  
54. Labor Legislation in Brazil, BRAZIL TRAVEL, http://www.vbrazil.com/government/ 
laws/labor.html.  
55. Id.  
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The Ministry of Labor through its technocrats has recognized all 
kinds of “so-called” unions, in the name of the freedom of 
association that, in reality, is just an opportunism motivated by 
the easy funding from the union official contribution . . . “[t]he 
real purpose is to demoralize the singleness system, which 
allowed the unstoppable formation of weak, “yellow”, “stamp”, 
“ghost” unions, nothing less than 15.961, 11.354 of workers and 
4.607 of employers, an increase of 42.6% since 1991, according 
to Center Union polling in 2002 from IBGE.”56 
Defenders of the singleness of labor organizations argue that the 
plurality of organizations would make unions weak because there would be 
a great number of them dealing with the same workers’ rights in different 
ways, and thus diluting the strength of the workers’ movement.  On the 
contrary, it is the Brazilian singleness that has been causing this exact 
problem, since organizations tend to create divisions in professions and 
categories that do not really exist, fragmenting description of duties in an 
attempt to create their own organization.57  Among the 1900 labor 
organizations in Brazil, only 1000 are effective representatives of workers’ 
interests.58  If Brazil ratified Convention No. 87, those organizations would 
be the only ones that would survive.59 
In 2002, the National Council on Economic and Social Development 
elaborated a final report that, among other dispositions on labor 
associations in Brazil, recommended that the principles in Convention No. 
87 be applied.60  A Labor National Forum started working on this task, and 
in its final report, the same recommendation was present.  However, the 
labor association reform project never went forward because of a lack of 
legislative interest in changing the current model.61 
In a Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association 
Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, it is said that 
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[t]he provisions contained in a national constitution concerning 
the prohibition of creating more than one trade union for a given 
occupational or economic category, regardless of the level of 
organization, in a given territorial area which in no case may be 
smaller than a municipality, are not compatible with the 
principles of freedom of association.62 
A study performed by the Secretary of Labor Relations of the Ministry 
of Labor and Employment in Brazil identifies the existence of 23,726 
associations registered and spread over 1950 categories.63  It seems that 
creativity is the only limit for starting an association.  Some examples of 
current unions are:  Country Artists’ Union, Astrologers’ Union, Union of 
the Professions in Collective Bargaining, Union of the Owners of Pure 
Blood English Horses, Rug Workers’ Union, Union of Workers of Similar 
Categories, Union of Sellers of “Acaraje” and other Typical Foods.64 
Convention No. 87 has similar topics as those in Article 22 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which dictates that 
every person has the right to organize and be part of labor organizations of 
its choosing, being subject only to restrictions that are needed in a 
democratic society such as national security interest, public order, and 
protection of rights and freedoms.65  Similar language appears in Article 
Eight of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and Article Sixteen of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica), ratified in 1992 by Brazil without 
reservations.  Singleness of association does not seem a necessity in a 
democratic society and, does not even respond to national security interests, 
public order or protection of rights and freedoms.  It is only an unjustified 
restriction to the ample freedom of association that includes labor 
organizations.66 
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If Convention No.  87 were ratified by Brazil, according to Article 
Five of the Brazilian Constitution, these two interpretations would be 
possible:  
a) According to Paragraph Two, the Convention No. 87 would 
enter the domestic legal system as a constitutional norm, because 
it contains fundamental human rights.67  However, there would 
be a conflict with art. 8, II of the Constitution that would be 
resolved by choosing the most favorable norm (a principle of 
labor law in Brazil).  The most favorable norm to workers would 
be Convention No. 87 and art. 8 would simply stop being 
applied. 
b) If the internalization of the convention followed the 
procedures in Paragraph 3 of art. 5, the dispositions in 
Convention No. 87 would be part of the roll of human rights 
protected by the constitution with the same status of a 
constitutional amendment, that is,  it would be a petrous clause, 
which means it would not be taken out of the constitution.68  
However, problems could arise in the case of eventual 
denunciation of the convention. 
Convention No. 87 would probably be considered supra-legal or 
even constitutional law, if ratified.  However, ratification has not occurred 
because it conflicts with Brazil’s Constitution regarding the singleness of 
unions per region and category present in Brazil’s domestic legal system.  
Although judges and doctrine writers favor the ratification of Convention 
No. 87, Brazil’s legislative bodies have chosen not to consider changes to 
the constitution regarding this issue yet. 
V. THE UNITED STATES’ DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM 
A. International Conventions in the American Legal System 
According to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the 
Constitution, 
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This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby.69 
Therefore, when the United States ratifies a convention such as No. 87 
of the ILO, it will become part of the law of the land, and it will bind states 
as any other law. 
The procedure for the ratification of treaties includes the submission of 
the signed treaty to the Senate, where a committee on foreign relations will 
analyze it.70  If the Senate approves the treaty by a majority vote of two 
thirds, the President proclaims the treaty to enter into effect.71  Art. II (Two) 
of the United States Constitution provides that the President “shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”72 
There is nothing in the constitution differentiating the hierarchy of 
treaties when compared to domestic law, or the treatment of treaties that 
incorporate human rights.  These more detailed issues are left for the courts 
to decide.  As an example of these applications, the case Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) establishes the ‘last-in-time rule;’ when 
there is a clash between an international treaty provision and a national law, 
the ‘newest’ law applies.73 
Steve Charnovitz, Associate Professor of Law at George Washington 
University Law School, explains that 
“ILO conventions have the potential to be directly applied by U.S 
courts.  In the case Warren v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that the United States, as owner of a merchant ship, was 
liable to seamen for injuries he had suffered on shore leave.  In 
deciding the case, the court appeared to accept the applicable ILO 
convention as United States law.”74 
However, courts could also require implementing legislation that 
would incorporate Convention No. 87 into domestic law, superseding any 
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prior federal or state statutes that might have conflicting legal requirements 
due to the last-in-time rule.75 
B. The International Labour Organization and Convention No. 87—The 
United States’ View 
Although United States officials had been among the writers of the 
ILO Constitution in 1919, relations between the ILO and the United States 
have not always been smooth.  The United States withdrew from ILO in 
1975, and in the “notice of withdraw[al] . . . , secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger stressed that question[s] involving relation[s] between states and 
proclamation of economic principles should be left to the U.N. . . . [and that 
the ILO should not] exceed its mandate.”76 
The United States only rejoined the organization in 1980 after 
establishing a consultative committee to oversee international labor issues.77  
This consultative committee, the President’s Committee on the ILO 
(PCILO), is comprised of the Secretaries of State and Commerce, 
President's National Security Advisor, the Assistant to the President for 
Economic Policy, the Presidents of the AFL-CIO, and the United States 
Council for International Business (USCIB).78  This committee adopted a 
tripartite rule of analysis for ILO conventions: 
1. If there are any differences between the convention and 
Federal law and practice, these will be dealt with in the normal 
legislative process; 
2. There is no intention to change State law and practice by 
federal action through ratification of ILO conventions; 
3. The examination will include possible conflicts between 
Federal and State law that would be caused by such ratification.79 
The group responsible for this analysis is a subcommittee called 
Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS); this 
procedure must be followed before any ILO convention is sent to the 
United States Senate for ratification.80 
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Back in 1949, President Truman transmitted Convention No. 87 to the 
Senate for advice and consent.81  However, this is the longest-pending 
treaty before the Senate.82  One interesting aspect is that, although the 
United States has not ratified the convention, it has required other countries, 
to which it has trade relations with, to do so.  “In one somewhat ironic 
episode, Indonesia ratified Convention No. 87 in 1998 after being urged to 
do so by the United States government and the International Monetary 
Fund.”83  Facts like these subject the United States to criticism that it does 
not practice what it preaches.  Besides this reputational cost to the country, 
the United States also places itself at a disadvantage because it cannot bring 
complaints against other countries that fail in observation of what they 
ratified.84 
Like Brazil, the United States also raises concerns about the 
harmonization with domestic law as one of the reasons for not ratifying 
Convention No. 87.  TAPILS considered the convention very different from 
American labor standards because it would require so many drastic changes 
to existing United States laws.85 
Some other reasons given were: 
a) It would broaden the classes of employees covered under the 
NLRA, because certain classes of workers such as 
supervisors, public employees and independent contractors 
are excluded from coverage under the NLRA; 
b) The Landrum-Griffin Act’s detailed regulation of union 
election procedures and comprehensive standards for union 
conduct exceeds the non-interference standard set out in ILO 
in Convention No. 87; 
c) Convention No. 87 requires that minority unions be allowed 
to function and be allowed to represent members in 
individual grievances, which is contrary to Section Nine(a) 
of the NLRA; 
d) It would effectively force employers to be neutral to all 
union organizing efforts; 
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e) It would limit United States restrictions on the right to strike, 
including in secondary boycotts, in both public and private 
sectors.86 
All these aspects are present in the American legislation and case law 
regarding labor rights. 
However, in the first annual report sent under the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Conventions, the United States government in 
2000 acknowledged that:  “there are aspects of this system that fail to fully 
protect the rights to organize and bargain collectively.”87  Although 
statements like these are important recognitions, the United States has not 
yet moved forward with the idea of ratifying Convention No. 87.  It is 
interesting to note that due to the United States’ membership in the ILO, the 
country has to at least comply with the principles of the ILO, such as 
freedom of association.88 
C. Workers’ Freedom of Association in the American Legal System 
The United States argues that the freedom for employees and 
employers to decide on employment contractual provisions is at the core of 
American legislation and case law, and that this is the idea of “negative 
rights” (i.e., for the right to be honored), therefore the state does not need to 
do anything.89  However, Lance Compa, senior lecturer at Cornell 
University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, argues that “a 
government that respects workers’ negative rights is not meeting its 
international human rights obligations if private individuals or groups can 
violate workers’ rights with impunity.90  The state must protect the rights by 
providing effective recourse and remedies for violations.”91 
An important report from the Human Rights Watch titled “Unfair 
Advantage:  Workers' Freedom of Association in the United States under 
International Human Rights Standards,” which was also written by Lance 
Compa, brought significant insights into the United States relations to 
international labor standards.92 
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The absence of systematic government repression does not mean 
that workers in the United States have effective exercise of the 
right to freedom of association, freedom of association is under 
sustained attack in the United States, and the government is often 
failing its responsibility under international human rights 
standards to deter such attacks and protect workers’ rights.93 
The first federal statute to deal with unions and their rights was the 
Railway Labor Act of 1926, and it still applies to workers in the railway 
and airline sectors.94  The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 is considered to be 
the document that brought “[t]he broader break in the hostile legal 
climate”95 towards unions by making yellow dog contracts (when an 
employee agrees, as a condition of employment, not to be a member of a 
labor union) unenforceable and by not allowing courts to use injunctions in 
nonviolent disputes. 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, the Wagner Act in 
its original version, came right after the effects of the Great Depression and 
the increase in strikes.96  Senator Robert Wagner once argued:  “What does 
it profit a man to have so-called “political freedom” if he is made an 
economic slave?”97 
Two other documents followed as amendments to the NLRA:  The 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Harley) and The Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin).98  
The former added union Unfair Labor Practices and the “right to work,” 
made closed shops illegal, 99 and excluded supervisors from its protection 
among other changes.100  The latter increased restrictions on secondary 
boycotts.101 
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Supervisors are not the only category not covered by the NLRA.  Its 
provisions regarding the rights to organize and bargain collectively also 
cause managers, confidential employees, independent contractors, 
agricultural workers, and domestic workers to suffer the same fate.  The 
exclusion means “employers can discharge these workers with impunity for 
attempting to form and join a union.”102 
There is no specific mention of the rights to organize in the United 
States Constitution.  However, the First Amendment protects freedom of 
assembly.103  Furthermore, the United States ratified the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights in 1992 and did not enter any 
reservations, declarations, or understandings with respect to Article 
Twenty-Two on freedom of association.104  Nevertheless, there are 
numerous cases where employees have been fired because of their attempt 
to assemble.  The Human Rights Watch report brought some examples: 
At the Palm Garden nursing home in North Miami, the Unite for 
Dignity campaign narrowly lost an election, thirty-five to thirty-
two, in April 1996.  Palm Garden management resorted to 
massive unlawful means including repeated threats to cut pay and 
benefits if workers chose union representation.  Managers forged 
signatures on warning notices against Leonard “Ted” Williams, a 
key Unite for Dignity activist . . . Its personnel manual states:  
This is a non-union health center . . . If you are approached to 
join a union, we sincerely hope you will consider the individual 
freedoms you could give up, and the countless risks you could be 
taking.  We intend to protect those freedoms and prevent those 
risks for you by opposing unionization of this health care center 
by every lawful means available.105 
This unfair labor practice situation was “confirmed by the NLRB in its 
Decision, Order, and Direction of Second Election, Palm Garden of North 
Miami and UNITE, 327 NLRB No. 195 (March 31, 1999), pp. 6–8, 13–
14.”106  One interesting fact is that “[t]he NLRB website appears to say 
nothing about the international labor law binding the United States and does 
not advise worker or employer organizations of their right to complain to 
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the CFA about a Board decision that transgresses the principles of the 
ILO.”107 
They can do so because the United States is a member of the ILO and 
as such has to comply with ILO’s principles.  In addition, “[a]djudications 
of the ILO are obviously not foreign law; they are reflective of international 
law which is part of the United States law.”108 
Although the chances of Convention No. 87 being ratified by the 
United States are extremely low, as determined by careful analysis of the 
literature provided, new steps in the direction of ratification could be 
possible if the President’s Committee on the ILO or the Senate worked for 
it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Brazil and United States have many historical, cultural, social, legal, 
and economic differences.  While Brazil went through a long period of 
military dictatorship, the United States did not.  During the drafting of the 
Brazilian democratic constitution, some political parties fought to include in 
the extensive text of the constitution the protection of the workers’ rights as 
one of the constitutional rights that government has to act upon.  Whereas, 
in the United States, the constitution brings mostly political rights and does 
not go through details of the social rights it provides.  Legislation in Brazil 
is friendlier to workers than to employers, coming from the premise that 
workers do not have the same power over employment contracts and labor 
relations as employers do.  In the United States, both are considered to have 
negotiation powers over the employment contract and both are free to 
terminate it as would be in any other contract. 
Considering economic aspects, Brazil is still a developing country 
which depends more on selling commodities than on its own industrial and 
technological strength, whereas the United States is a developed country 
with technology that spreads to all corners of the world through its strong 
businesses interchanges. 
In which country are workers’ association rights more protected?  
Despite the cited differences, neither Brazil nor the United States has 
protected workers’ right of association according to international standards 
since they have not ratified Convention No. 87 of the ILO, because of 
divergent domestic laws.  This phrase from Lance Compa about the United 
States could actually be said of both countries:  “What is most needed is a 
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new spirit of commitment by the labor law community and the government 
to give effect to international human rights.”109 
By analyzing both countries’ laws and international reports on the 
right of association, the conclusion that emerges is that while the United 
States clearly tries to make it difficult for workers to associate by setting up 
complicated rules for unionization and excluding many categories of 
workers from its labor laws, Brazil tries to ignore that its laws weaken or 
even nullify workers’ attempt to do so.  By not allowing a diversity of 
unions, Brazil leaves the path open to the creation of weaker divisions.  
Both countries may defend their policies by saying that they have economic 
reasons to protect companies and employers against the expenses and 
market inefficiencies that protecting workers’ rights could bring, but these 
arguments have not satisfied the ILO. 
The two main purposes of international labor law, stated by Steve 
Charnovitz, are:  “First, ILO standards can provide the rules of the road for 
the world economy and labor-markets.  Second, the international labor 
regime can enhance the accountability of domestic labor agencies and 
prevent regulatory failure.”110  Both Brazil and the United States should 
take these purposes and the advantages that they bring to the country into 
consideration because it could help balance the weight between protection 
of workers’ rights and economic development.  It is in the governments’ 
interest and obligation to make greater efforts towards protecting 
employment relationship in order to prevent economic crises and to avoid a 
backlash in workers and human rights, because countries’ leaders are 
expected, by the people who put them in power, to make their country grow 
not only economically, but also in human development aspects. 
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